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ABSTRACT
The assumption that bondholders follow either a buy-and—hold or a
continuousrealization trading policy, rather than the optimal trading policy,
is at variance with reality and, as we demonstrate, may seriously bias the
estimation of the yield curve and the implied tax bracket of the marginal
investor. Tax considerations which govern a bondholder's optimal trading
policyinclude the following: realization of capital losses, short term if
possible; deferment of the realization of capital gains, especially if they
are short term; changing the holding period status from long term to short
term by sale of the bond and repurchase, so that future capital losses may be
realized short term; and raising the basis through sale of the bond and
repurchase in order to deduct from ordinary income the amortized premium.
Because of the interaction of these factors, no simple characterization of the
optimal trading policy is possible. We can say, however, that it differs
substantially from the buy-and-hold policy irrespective of whether the
bondholder is a bank, a bond dealer, or an individual. We obtain these strong
results even when we allow for transactions costs and explicitly consider
numerous IRS regulations designed to curtail tax avoidance.
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1101 East 58th Street Yale University
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Theyield curve implied by the prices of Treasury notes and bonds and
corporate bonds is of interest to economists and practitioners alike: it
reflects the investors' beliefs about the future course of the short term
interest rate. In calculating the yield curve, the tax bracket of the
marginal bondholder is either taken to be some given number or is estimated
simultaneously with the yield curve. The implied tax bracket of the marginal
investor is of independent interest. It provides a direct (but incomplete)
test of Miller's (1977) theory on the optimal capital structure of firms. It
may also be useful for determining fair prices for other assets.
There are two major problems in estimating pure discount rates (the yield
curve of zero coupon bonds) and the implied marginal tax rate. The first
problem is that of differing clienteles, studied in detail by Schaefer (1981,
1982a). For a given investor some bonds of particular maturities and coupon
rates maybedominated by combinations of other bonds. In this case tax
clienteles naturally arise.If there is no one clientele for which every bond
remains undominated, then the concept of the "marginal taxable investor" who
"sets" all prices may well be meaningless.
The second problem is that of the assumed investment horizon. This is
the focus of the present paper. By necessity we ignore the problems of tax
clienteles. Extant estimation procedures assume either that the bond is held
to maturity, without intermediate realization of capital gains and losses (the
buy—and—hold policy), or that capital gains and losses are realized every
period as they occur (the continuous realization policy). Both the buy-and-
hold policy and the continuous realization policy lead to relatively simple
bond pricing formulae. This facilitates the estimation of the yield curve and
the implied tax bracket of the marginal investor.2
The assumption that bondholders follow either a buy—and-hold or a
continuous realization trading policy, rather than the optimal trading policy,
is at variance with reality and, as we demonstrate, may seriously bias the
estimation of the yield curve and the implied tax bracket of the marginal
investor. Perusal of the Wall Street Journal provides convincing evidence
that investment advisors——and presumably their clients are aware of the
optimal trading policies which frequently differ sharply from a buy-and—hold
or continuous realization policy. By definition, the marginal bondholder is
an economic agent (or group of agents) of sufficient stature to set bond
prices at the margin. It is illogical then to assert that the marginal
investor follows a suboptimal trading policy through ignorance.
The present paper unifies two recent strands of research, the pricing of
bonds with stochastically varying interest rates and investment opportunity
set and the pricing of stocks in the presence of personal taxes. Cox,
Ingersoll and Ross (1981, 1983) presented an equilibrium theory of bond
pricing and the term structure of interest rates, in particular explaining the
valuation of. a deterministic stream of cash flows but with a stochastically
varying interest rate and investment opportunity set. Constantinides (1982,
1983) and Constantinides and Scholes (1980) discussed the optimal trading of
stocks and options in the presence of personal taxes and presented an
equilibrium theory of stock pricing, in particular explaining the effect of
optimal realization of capital gains and losses on the pricing of stocks.
Tax considerations which govern a bondholder's optimal trading policy
include the following: realization of capital losses, short term if possible;
deferment of the realization of capital gains, especially if they are short
term; changing the holding period status from long term to short term by sale
of the bond and repurchase, so that future capital losses may be realized3
short term; and raising the basis through sale of the bond and repurchase in
order to deduct from ordinary income the amortized premium. Because of the
interaction of these factors, no simple characterization of the optimal
trading policy is possible. We can say, however, that it differs
substantially from the buy-and-hold policy irrespective of whether the
bondholder is a bank, a bond dealer, or an individual. We obtain these strong
results even when we allow for transactions costs and explicitly consider
numerous IRS regulations designed to curtail tax avoidance.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline the tax
provisions in four representative tax scenarios which may apply to the elusive
marginal bondholder. The formal model is presented in Section 3. Closed—form
solutions for the prices of consol bonds and the value of the timing option
are presented in Section 4 for a special case. In Section 5 we derive the
optimal trading policies under more general conditions and in Section 6 we
illustrate the effect of taxes on the prices of bonds and on the value of the
timing option. The estimation of the yield curve and the tax bracket of the
marginal investor is grossly biased if the value of the timing option is
ignored. This point is illustrated in Section 7. In Section 8 we discuss
municipal bonds. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 9.
2. The Tax Environment
To avoida profusion of details in our discussion we abstract from many
of the nuances of the regulations governing the taxation of income, as defined
by the tax code and its interpretation by the Internal Revenue Service and the
courts. We do emphasize, however, certain important aspects of the code,
which, though largely ignored in finance, may materially affect bond prices
and the estimation of the yield curve and the marginal tax rate. We also
provide some historical perspective to familiarize the reader with major4
changes in the tax code which may be reflected in a time series of bond
yields.
At least four broad classes of potential marginal investorswarrant
examination: individuals, banks and bond dealers, corporations, andtax—
exempt institutions. Consider first the tax rules applicable to individual
investors.
Coupon income (net of interest expense) is taxed at the individual's
marginal tax rate on ordinary income, the maximum rate being currently 50%.
Between 1970 and 1980, coupon income was classified as "unearned income" and
was taxed at a maximum rate of 72%. Prior to the seventies, the top marginal
tax rate varied from a low of 7% in 1913 to a high of 95% in 1945. Inour
calculations we assume that the marginal tax rate oncoupon income for an
if individual is t =c
The taxation of capital gains is complex. Unrealized gains and losses
remain untaxed. Gains and losses are taxed in theyear that they are
realized. A realized gain or loss is the difference between the salesprice
(less cost of sale) and the basis. For most assets the basis is just the
purchase price (plus cost of purchase), but for some bonds the purchase price
is subject to adjustment.
We consider only original issue par bonds, defined as such by the IRS if
the original issue discount does not exceed 1/4 of 1 percent multipliedby the
number of full years to maturity. For these bonds, if the purchaseprice •in
the secondary market is below par, no adjustment is made and the basis isjust
the purchase price. If the purchase price is above par, this difference is
1/
Miller (1977) shows that, under simple tax rules, the marginal
bondholder is in thecorporatetaxbracket,and provides partial justification
for our choice of the tax rate. In any case, ourqualitativeresults are
insensitive to the assumed rate.5
2/
amortized linearly to the maturity date.'The amount amortized in a tax year
is allowed as a deduction against ordinary income and the bond's basis is
correspondingly reduced. There is no specific limitation on this deduction.
In our calculations the amortized amount is (negatively) taxed at the rate
T =.5.
C
Realized capital gains and losses are either short term or long term.
The required holding period for long term treatment is currently one year.
This has varied many times since capital gains were first differentiated from
ordinary income in 1922. In the years 1942—1977 the holding period wassix
months. Prior to that time there were three or more categories of long term
capital gains with required holding periods as long as ten years.
Net short term capital gains are taxed as ordinary income. Net long term
capital gains are currently taxed at 40% of the investor's marginal taxrate
on ordinary income. This treatment has also been changed. The taxrate on
long term gains has varied from 20% to 80% of the tax rate on ordinary
income. In addition there have been periods in which alternate treatment
could be elected (or, was required for large capital gains).
Net short term capital losses and 50% of net long term capital losses are
deducted from ordinary income and may jointly reduce the taxable ordinary
income by a maximum of $3,000 (until 1976, $1,000). Unused losses are carried
forward indefinitely. Short term losses and long term gains, incurred in the
same year, offset each other dollar for dollar, instead of beingtaxed at
their respective rates.
2/—amortizationis optional for Treasury and corporate bonds. Since for
practically all individuals the marginal tax rate on ordinary incomeis no
less than the capital gains tax rate, amortization of the basis dominates
foregoing this option. The amortization method need not be straight line,but
may be that customarily used by the individual,if it is deemed to be
reasonable. If the bond is callable, the basis is amortized to the call price
at the call date or to par at maturity, whichever yields the smaller
amortization. If there are alternate call dates the rule is complex.6
We define rto be the marginal tax rate on short term capital gains
arid losses. This rate is not necessarily equal to the marginal tax rate on
ordinary income: if the investor has net short term losses and the deduction
limit is binding, r =0;if the investor has net short term losses but
larger long term gains, tis 40% of the marginal tax rate on ordinary
income. Likewise, we defineTL to be the marginal tax rate on long term
capital gains and losses.
If an asset is sold at a loss within thirty days before or after the
acquisition of "substantially identical" property, the IRS can disallow the
loss deduction under the "wash sale" rule. An investor has a high probability
of circumventing this rule by purchasing instead another bond with a slightly
different coupon or maturity. In any case, this rule is not applicable to
dealers or individual taxpayers who are in the business of trading bonds.
Consequently we ignore the wash sale rule throughout this paper.
We consider three representative tax scenarios for an individual
bondholder and one scenario for banks or bond dealers, as defined by the
marginal rates t, t, and
I. The marginal investor is an individual. Coupon income is taxed at
the rate T =.5.Realized short term and long term gains and C
losses are taxed at the rate t == .25.The deduction limit is s L
not binding.
This scenario is plausible if the individual is periodically forced to
sell some of his portfolio assets by factors beyond his control (or, of more
importance than the tax consequences) and, on average, realizes large long
term gains. Then the deduction limit is not binding. Since short term losses
must be used to offset the long term gains, the marginal tax rate is the long7
3/
term gains rate. We take the long term gains rate to be half of the
investor's marginal tax rate on ordinary income, as it was between 1942 and
1979. We also assume that the investor can always defer the realization of
short term gains until the holding period exceeds one year and then realize
the gains long term.
II. The marginal investor Is an individual. Coupon incom istaxed at
the rate t =.5.Realized short term gains and losses are taxed
at the rate =.5.Realized long term gains and losses are taxed
at the rate =.25.The deduction limit is not binding.
Scenario II is the least plausible one because it ignores both the
deduction limit and the (unfavorable for the taxpayer) offsetting of long term
4/
gains with short term losses. Since investors have a tax incentive to
realize losses and defer gains (at least, short term gains), the assumption
that the deduction limit is not binding may be tenuous and is relaxed in the
next scenario.
3/—Similarlythe right to deduct half of long term losses from income,
even under the current 40% rule for long term capital gains,could not be
used. Losses could only be deducted from other capital gains. Thus, the
effective tax rate on both long term gains and losses is the same.
4/—Theindividual may mitigate this offset provision of the tax law by
realizing long term gains and short and long term losses in alternatetax
years; however, we do not explicitly modelthis. See Constantirtides (1982).
This procedure may also help to avoid the unfavorable long term gain andloss
offset.8
III. The marginal investor is an individual. Coupon income is taxed at
the rate t= .5.Short and long term gains and losses remain
untaxed, i.e., t== 0. — s L
One justification for this scenario is to assume that the individual
realizes losses and defers gains. At the margin losses can only be carried
forwardas the deduction limit isbinding. The only tax "game" permitted
under this scenario is to realize a gain on a bond in orderto raise its basis
abovepar and start deducting the premium amortization against ordinary
income. As we shall see, this policy is profitable.
Althoughcorporations are taxed differently from individuals, the tax
regulationson nonbankcorporations that hold bonds for reasons not directly
relatedto their business purposes are sufficiently similar to those applying
to individuals that the previous scenarios remain at least qualitatively
correct. The primary distinction is that a net capital loss (short and long
combined) cannot be deducted in any amount from ordinary income, but maybe
carried back for three years and forward for five years as a short term loss
to offset gains. Banks and (corporate or individual) bond dealers are taxed
differently, however.
For banks and dealers, bond coupons and all realized capital gains and
losses are treated as ordinary income or loss without explicit limitation.
Net operating losses of banks are carried back for ten years and forward for
five years. In the following scenario we effectively assume that the bank has
positive net earnings in every ten year period so that loss benefits are
earned immediately. Corporate earnings and losses are taxed at the corporate
rate of 50%. (The current corporate tax rate is 46% on earnings in excess of
$100,000. In the past it has been as high as 54%.) The same scenario applies
toa bond dealer with marginal personal or corporate tax rate on ordinary
income equal to 50%.9
IV. The marginal holder is a bank or bond dealer. Coupon income and all
capital gains and losses are taxed at the rate'r =t == .5.
C s L
There is no deduction limit.
In each of the scenarios, I-IV, the tax rates r ,tandtare
c S L
assumed to remain constant over time because we wish to focus on the long run
effect of taxes on bond prices. Certain trading policies not examined here
would become optimal at the timethat tax provisions were about to change.
For example, when the effective maximum rate on long term capital gains was
changed from 28% to 20% by the 1978 Tax Revenue Act, individuals paying the
28% rate should have deferred realizing their capital gains, ceteris
paribus. Similarly if an investor's income were to change sufficiently to
place him in a different tax bracket, the optimaltrading policy might be
affected.
We also examine bond prices in each of the four tax scenarios underthe
assumption that the bondholder is (artificially) constrained to follow a buy—
and—hold policy and compare the bond prices, tax timing option, and yields to
the case when the investor follows optimal policies. The buy—and-hold economy
is taken as our primary benchmark in which there are no price effects induced
by tax trading.
We do not explicitly examine a scenario in which the marginal bondholder
is exempt from all taxes. This might be considered a serious omission because
tax-exempt intermediaries currently hold more than one-third of all the
outstanding government and corporate bonds and account for an even greater
proportion of the trading volume. Furthermore, liberalized tax-deferred
retirement plans provide growing opportunities for taxable individuals to
defer the tax on coupons, dividends and capital gains until retirement. If
the marginal investor is tax—exempt, then there are obviously no tax—induced10
5/
tbiaSeStin bond prices. However, since the no—trading policy dominates any
other for a tax—exempt investor (in a perfect market), we may assume the buy—
and-holdpolicy. Consequently bond prices should equal the benchmark values,
andstandard estimation techniques, such as McCulloch's (1975), should verify
that the marginal tax bracket is zero.
3. The )de1
Our goal is to find the price of a default—free bond with par value one,
continuous coupon rate c, and maturity date T. The bond is perfectly
6/
divisible and may be bought or sold with zero transactions costs. The bond
price is a function of the state vector Y (defined below) and time t,
i.e., P =P(Y,t; c, T).
we price the coupon bond relative to short term (instantaneous) lending
via a riskiess, "single period" bond with maturity dt and before—tax yield
r(Y, t). The single period bond is perfectlj divisible and may be bought or
sold with zero transactions costs. Effectively there is unlimited riskiess
lending over the time interval dt at the before—tax interest rate r.If an
investor's tax rate on ordinary income is r, his after—tax interest rate
i. (1
We assume that, throughout the term to this coupon bond's maturity, some
investor with tax rates tc T5, and r (oncoupon income, short term
5/— Evenin this case, however, when taxes do not affect bond prices, taxed
investors will still benefit from following trading policies different from
the buy-and-hold. The value of trading optimally will of course depend upon
what taxesthey must pay. Thus, the timing option will have the same quali-
tative propertiesit does in one of the examined scenarios.
6/— Transactionscosts on bonds are small and are of the order of magnitude
of the bid—asked spread. In Section 6 (Table 6) we introduce transactions
costsand show that the pricing implications and the value of the tinting
optionremainlargelyunaffected.11
capital gains and losses, and long terra capitalgains and losses,
respectively) is indifferent between buyingthe coupon bond or investing in
the single—period bond. That there exists sometax bracket (t ,T, c sL
with the property that an investor in this taxbracket is indifferent between
the two investments over a time interval dt,is a weak assumption. The
strong part of our assumption is thatinvestors in the same tax brackt are
the margin throughout the bond's term tomaturity.In a richer model (beyond
our present scope) one might allow for the possibilitythat the bond is passed
from one tax clientele to another as it approachesmaturity or as it becomes a
premium or discount bond due to shiftsin interest rates. Since we wish to
focus on the already complex problem of the optimalrealization of capital
gains and losses, we abstract from issuesrelated to changing tax
7/
clienteles. We make the (perhaps unnecessarily strong)assumption that all
marginal investors are in the same tax bracket.
We present first a discussion of the issuesrelating to the determination
of the equilibrium bond prices and the value to amarginal, investor of holding
a particular bond with an establishedcost basis. In the next section we use
a specific model to discuss the valuation problemfrom the point of view of
investors not at the margin.
7/Tax clienteles for bonds is an importantissue which has been
extensively discussed by Schaefer (1981, 1982a,1982b) under the assumption
that bonds are held to maturity. As we demonstratebelow, under tax laws
similar to those in the U.S., a buy-and-hold policyis inferior to trading
schemes which involve (among other things) earlyrealization of capital
losses. Under British regulations1 which imposedno long term capital gains
tax on "gilt" securities prior to 1962 orafter 1969, such trading schemes
have no direct benefits, so a buy—and-hold policyis not necessarily
inferior. Neither need it be correct, however.Even in Schaefer's world,
future changes in interest rates or theintroduction of new bonds may cause an
existing bond to become dominated for itscurrent clientele. The anticipation
of such events should be reflected in thebond's price, and this may mask some
clientele effects. For example, any bond currentlyselling at a discount that
appears to have a high taxclientele was originally a par bond atwhich time
it probably appeared to have a lower taxclientele..12
The price of a coupon bond, P, is defined to be such that an investor
in the given tax bracket (t,, t )isindifferent between purchasing the c SL
coupon bond now or investing p dollars in the single period bond over the
time interval dt. This equilibrium condition is formalized below as the
after-tax version of the local expectations hypothesis. After purchasing the
coupon bond, the investor follows the derived optimal trading policy as
opposed to a continuous realization or a buy—and—hold policy.
If an investor's cost basis differs from the prevailing bond price, he
may be unwilling (or more than willing) to sell it at that price and thereby
realize a capital gain or loss. His reluctance (or eagerness) to sell has
nothing to do with the bond price being "unfair." If his cost basis were
equal to the price, the same investor would be indifferent to selling at that
price because, by definition, the bond price is such that he is indifferent
between purchasing the bond (and establishing a basis equal to the price)or
investing in the short-term dicount bond.
There may be instances when all investors have cost bases such that
nobody is willing to sell the bond at the "prevailing price." To avoid this
purely technical difficulty, we assume that the government supplies any
existing bond at the above—defined price with infinite elasticity. This
assumption assures that the market price is well defined and trades may always




Alternatively, we could assume that bonds are fixed in supply and some
investors are occasionally forced to trade for reasons unrelated to optimal
tax trading. "Liquidity purchasers" will never pay above their reservation
price because the discount bond is available. "Liquidity sellers," however,
may not be able to hold out for their reservation price.13
AA
Thevalue of the bond to an investor, V(Y, t; C,T;P, t), is defined
as the present value of the stream of cash flows associated with the bond,
assuming that the optimal policy in realizing capital gains and losses is
followed. The symbols p and t denote the current cost basis and the time
at which the bond was purchased.
At those "stopping times" at which the investor either by choice or by
force sells the bond and realizes a capital gain or loss, the value to the
investor is simply the after—tax proceeds from its immediate sale. The bond's
maturity date is an obvious stopping time for all investors. At maturity, the
capital gain or loss is unavoidably realized, hence




A similar result is true at any stopping time prior to maturity when the
investor sells his bonds. For the sequence of (possibly random) stopping
times, t =t1,t2, ...,atwhich the investor realizes a capital gain or
loss,
V(Y, t; c, T; P, t) =(1—T)P+ if t —t4 1
=(1— +L' if t —t> 1 (2)
at t =t1,t2
Stopping times maydifferacross investors. At the stopping times chosen
by the investor the "smooth—pasting" (or "high contact") condition also must
9/ hol
9/—Theseconditions are formally derived in Grigelionis and Shiryaev
continued14
=(1—t) — ,ift —t'.1
n n
=(1—IL)
,ift —t> 1 (3)
for n =1,2, ...,N,at t, t
The smooth-pasting condition is not imposed at those stopping times which
signify forced realizations. Forced realizations are assumed to be caused by
events exogenous to the model, e.g., an unanticipated and unavoidable need for
consumption or portfolio revision. Forced realizations are formally modelled
as Poisson arrivals with a constant force A. The Poisson process is
independent of the process which generates the movements of the state
variables.
For a marginal investor the time of purchase is also an optimal stopping
time since, by definition, he is indifferent to the purchase. Thus,
V(Y, t;c, T; P, t) =P (4a)
aP (1 —r5)— n 1, ...,N. (4b)
n n
This condition of indifference provides the link between the value of the bond
and its market price. It may also be interpreted as an alternative descrip-
tion of the marginal investor. As we see below, (4a) need not hold for non—
marginal investors who either receive a surplus by purchasing the bond at the
prevailing price or find buying the bond to be dominated by lending at the
short—term rate.
At all other times, the investor's value of the bond exceeds the after-
tax proceeds from immediate sale, and the investor optimally defers the
realization of a capital gain or loss. The set of states and times {,t}15
at which this occurs is referred to as the continuation region, i.e., in the
continuation region




In the continuation region, the investor's after-tax rate of return on
his bond is
dv ÷ (1 -t)Cdt+ max[O,(P -1)tdt/(T-t)]
v (6)
The term (p —1)Tdt/(T-t)is the tax benefit of the linearly amortized
premium when the basis is above par.
10/
We assume the after—tax version of the local expectations hypothesis:
The after—tax expected rate of return on the coupon bond (measured via the value
function) equals the after-tax single period rate of interest over the period
{t, t +dt},i.e.,
dV+ (1-r)cdt +max[0,(P —1)Tdt/(T —t)]
c ] =(1—t)rdt (7)
V C
forall Y, t, I', and t.
We assume that the state of the economy at time t is summarized by a
vector {Y (t)} This vector also summarizes the history of the economy,
Y(T), t<t, to the extent that the history is of current economicrelevance.
The state variables are jointly Markov with movements determined by the systemof
stochastic differential equations
10/—
SeeCox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1981) for a discussion of the different
forms of the expectations hypothesis. In another paper (1983) they show how
this assumption may be weakened by incorporating a risk premium into the drift
terms for the state variables.16
dY (t) p (Y, t)dt + cy'(Y, t)dw(t) (n =1,2, ...,N). (8) n n n
pis a scalar, c is a K—dimensional vector, KN, and dw(t)isthe n n
increment of the Wiener process w(t) in RK. The variance—covariance matrix
{a'a}is positive semidefinite and of rank K (positive definite, if
K =N).
If {y, t} lies in the continuation region, the expected value of dV due
to the movement of the state varlables Y, t, is given by Ito's Lemma, as the
first three terms of equation (9) below. The expected value of dV due to a
A A
stochasticforced realization is (P —T(t,t)(P -P)-V]Adtwhere
t(t, t) is the short term or long term rate, depending on the bond's status.
The term in the brackets is the loss incurred when the investor is forced to
deviate from his optimal policy. The term Xdt is the probability of a forced
realization over R,t÷ at]. Also, the expected value of dv due to the
amortization of the premium is -tnax[O,(P —1)dt/(T-t)].Then equation
(7) becomes
2 cxm + E + + [P -r(t,t)(P -P)-V]A n=1 1 n in n1 ii
(9)
+ (1 —T)c + — max[O,(P —1)/CT—t)]—rV=0 c c
Thesolutionto this differential equation, subject to the boundary conditions
(1) through (5), provides the bond price, P, the value of a bond to the17
investor, V, and the optimal policy for the realization of capital gains and
11/ losses.
For general functions (Y, t) and i(Y,t), a closed—form solution does
n n
not typically exist. In Section 4 we illustrate the solution procedure in a
simplified version of this problem and discuss the economic implications. In
Section 5 we provide numerical solutions to the general problem.
4. An Example
In this section we begin to examine the value of the timing option regarding
the realization of capital gains and losses on bonds and to analyze the effect of
the capital gains tax on their pricing. To discuss these issues in the simplest
possible setting and through closed—form solutions, we make a number of
simplifying assumptions.
We assume that there is only one state variable, the short term rate of
interest, r, with movements determined by the stochastic differential equation
dr =ctr2dt+sr3'12dw(t) (10)
12/
where dw(t) is the increment of the scalar Wiener process w(t). The
price, P(r; c), of an infinite maturity coupon bond is then a function ofthe
11/—Thenow-familiar American put pricing problem provides a useful
analogy. Let G(S, K, T) denote the value of a put with striking price K
and time to maturity T on a stock with price S. Equation (2) is analogous
to the condition at exercise, G(S*, K, T) =K-S.The "smooth pasting"
condition analogous to (3) is Gs(S*, K, T) =—1.Together these relations
are sufficient to derive both the pricing function G and the optimal
exercise policy S*(T). Similarly here we derive both the value function and
the optimal realization policy Y conditional on the bond price function.
Equation (4) then provides the closure finally giving all three.
12/
We mayalternativelyconsider (10) as the risk—adjusted interest rate
dynamics with a =i + iiwhere measures the expected change in the short
rate and itcapturesthe risk premium due on interest—rate—sensitive
securities. Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1980) discuss this interpretation for
the stochastic process in (10).18
short term interest rate, r, but is independent of the currenttime, t,
because the process generating interest rate movements isstationary.
We also assume that the. tax rates on all capital gains and lossesare equal,
i.e., t = r.Thus the length of time over which the bond has been held is
irrelevant, and the consol's value to an investor, V(r;C; p), is also
independent of the current time, t. Finally, we assumeaway forced
realizations, i.e., A =0.
It is easy to prove that any investor's optimal policy is to realizecapital
13/
losses immediately and defer capital gains indefinitely. Given the basis,
P, the continuation region is defined by the range of interest rates such that
P(r; c) > P. In the continuation region the differential equation (9) becomes
1/2 s2r3 ---+ar2 fL— (1—T)iV+ (1 —t)c=0,P(r;c) > P .(11)
The boundary condition (4a) becomes
A A
V(r;c; F) =F,at P(r; c) =P, (12)
and the "smooth-pasting" conditions (3) and (4a) become
av(r;c; p=-3P(r,c)
,atP(r; C) =P. (13)
The bond price P(r; c) is a function of the interest rate,r, and of the
parameters c, ci, $ ,t,and Inspection, of equation (10) indicates that
the parameters a and S are dimensionless as are the parameters t and
rc.
The units of the coupon yield c are dollarsper unit of time and the unit of
13/
This statement is formally proved in Constantinides (1983). If the
tax rates r and are unequal the optimal policy is a great deal more
complex. UJer these circumstances, the optimal policy for trading stocks is
discussed in Constantinides (1982) and the optimal policy fortrading bonds is
discussed in Section 5 of this paper.19
the interest rate is the inverse of the time unit. Thebond price must be
proportional to the coupon rate, and since it isinvariant to changes in the unit
of time, it must also be inversely proportional to r.Hence
P(r; c) =Hc/r (14)
where H is a function of only the parameters a, S, tand t.
Since we have determined the functional form of P, we can simplify(11)
with the aid of equation (14) to eliminate r and itsderivatives, obtaining
2 (1 —t)P
p2vpp + 2 —c&)PV
-(1— + HC =0,P > P . (15)
14/





+ A P11 Pfl + A1PltPh1,P > P (16)
(1— t +a—s )H
C
where A, A' are arbitrary constants to be determined,and ii, 1', (Ti < 0 < n')
arethe roots of the quadratic equation
2 2 —1)+ (s —a)*(1t) =0. (17)
—' y•t
Byhomogeneity, the coefficients of P' and p' mustbe proportional to the
parameters and p, respectively. Thus, A andA' depend only
on the parameters a, s, T, and t.
14/—Fora meaningful solution the parameters of theinterest rate process
must satisfy s2 -< 1 — From(22) and (23) the expected rate of price
appreciation and the limit (as r goes to zero) ofthe expected rate of
appreciation of the value function are both(s2 —ct)r.Thus, if the stated
condition is violated the expected rates of return including couponsmust
exceed the after—tax rate of interest (1 —T)rand the expectations
hypothesis cannot obtain as was assumed. Furthermore, giventhat the dynamics
may be interpreted in a risk—adjusted sense, asdiscussed in footnote 12, no
other equilibrium is possible either.20
The following argument determines A'. Since the optimal tradingpolicy
involves no sales at any price above the basis, p must have anegligible
effect on the value function whenever p >> p Formally
av lint —=0. (18)
p/p+co 9p
This condition is satisfied only if A' =0.The remaining two constants can













2 +Ai=1.-t. (1—t +a—g)H C
Wesolve for H and A and obtain
(l—t)c
c P(r;c)=




V(r;C;P) (1t)P +t P, P.P
=(i
—
1 +t )T1 ;i >
where
n— [s2/2—a+{(2,2—a)2+22 —
isthe negative root of (17).
Equation (21) shows that the price of a consol bond is increasing in the
capital gains tax rate of the marginal investor. A high capital gains rate
does not hurt the investor because he is never forced to realize gains and hioptimal policy is to defer indefinitely the realization of capital gains. In
fact a high capital gains rate is a benefit because it enables him to obtain
larger tax rebates by realizing a capital loss whenever such a loss occurs.
Provided that forced realizations are not too frequent, the same conclusion
also applies to a finite maturity par bond, as indeed is demonstrated in the
numerical solutions of Section 6. If the bond currently sells at par, the
investor can be neutral to the capital gains tax by following the naive policy
of deferring both gains and losses. The intelligent policy of deferring gains
and realizing losses can only turn the taxation to his advantage, and he
therefore benefits by a high capital gains tax rate.
We find the expected rate of price appreciation to be
dP 2 —
E[-J]= (s—cL)rdt(=yrdt) (23)
by using Ito's Lemma and equations (10) and (21). Sinces2 — 0,the
expected capital gains rate can be either positive or negative. We write the
bond price in terms of y and obtain
P(r; c) = dr (21)'
{i— y/(1—r )}{1—t/(1—
c
We observe that the bond price is increasing (decreasing) in the ordinary
income tax rate, if capital gains (losses) are expected. This indeterminancy
is due to the light taxation of capital gains relative to interest and coupon
income in this model. If capital gains are expected, the consol's current
coupon yield is less than the interest rate, and an increase in tc
represents a greater loss for potential holdings in the instantaneous bond
than in the consol.
We use two benchmarks to measure the value of the tax timing option. The
first is the price of the consol, H' in an economy where the marginal22
investor follows a buy-and-hold policy. This benchmark is also the consol's
15/
price in an economy with zero capital gains tax. Hence, we write
(1 —t)c
=
(1 y)r • (24)
The second benchmark is the consol price, 'inan economy where the
marginal bondholder realizes all gains and losses continuously. Proceeding as








Note that PC H' as y0: A continuous realization policy dominates the
buy—and—hold policy whenever capital losses are expected.






C tr y(1—Ti—r) = '1+ 27b P 1 — L 1— — y(1—T)
C
Whenthe buy—and—hold benchmark is used, the timing option's value derives
from the right to realize capital losses early. When the continuous-
15/
The buy—and—hold price is unaffected by the capital gains tax rate of
the marginal investor for the simple reason that no capital gains tax is ever
paid. This result differs from that reported in Constarttinides (1983) for
stocks. Although the tax liability is also postponed indefinitely for
equities, the expected rate of growth in price, adjusted for risk, equals the
discount rate so the present value of the tax liability is not negligible. In
our problem, the expected rate of growth in price ,yr, must be smaller than
the discount rate (1 —T)r.See footnote (14).23
realization benchmark is used, the timing option measures the value of
deferring capital gains.
A similar analysis can be performed for a non—marginal investor in the
tax bracket (r .,t ). Thevaluation equation (15) and general solution (16)
ci 1
retainthe same form with the same constant H but with different constants
A, A' and with different tax rates sabstituted. The optimal policy again
consists of realizing all losses immediately and holding all gains; therefore,
(13) is still a valid boundary condition. Equation (12), however, no longer
16/
obtains. Non—marginal investors need not value a potential purchase at the
price they pay for it. The valuation can be either more or less. Of course,
if they do buy, they must value the bond in excess of its price.
Since the bond's price is set by the marginal investor, only two
coefficients need to be determined for the non-marginal investor's problem.






16/—Fora non-maginal investor the difference between V(r; c; P) and
P, when P(r; c) =p,is the present value of all future benefits created by
optimal trading. Thus, whefl the investor sells, he values not only theafter
tax proceeds of the sale (p under the optimal strategy) but alsothe future
benefit in using this money to buy another bond. As in most problems with
heterogeneous taxes the non—marginal investor must be restrictedin some
fashion to keep his tax liabiity above zero (or minus infinity if rebates are
given). The assumption here is that short term borrowing to finance the





Any investor who finds V(r; c; P) > P enjoys a tax-induced surplus in
1
buying the bond. This is true for those tax brackets characterized by
1 —— t< O(l —11—t). (29)
There are two distinct tax effects. First, the larger the investor's
capital gains tax rate the greater is the surplus since losses provide larger
benefits. Second, when capital gains (losses) are expected, y > 0 (y < 0),
the larger (smaller) his ordinary tax rate, the greater the surplus. This
effect is the standard one of high tax investors' preference for capital
gains, observed even in buy—and—hold economies. Since the two tax rates are
positively related in a cross section of investors, the effects are enhancing
when capital gains are expected and opposing when capital losses are expected.
If the marginal holder of bonds is tax exempt, then there are no tax
effects on the consol's price. Nevertheless, even in this case equations (28)
and (29) reveal that many taxed investors may have a valuable timing option.
To measure the magnitude of the timing option we require estimates of the
parameters a and s and the marginal tax bracket. The current annual
riskless rate is approximately 11%. In using the Ibbotson and Sinquefield
(1982) study the reported annualized standard deviation of changes in the
short rate over the period 1926—1981 is 2.2%. Using equation (10) we. set s =
(0.022)(0.11)3/2=0.604.In the same study the reported standard deviation
of annualized returns on long term U.S. Treasury bonds is 5.7%. If we take
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If there are instantaneous tax exempt instruments with an interest
rate of (1 -t)r, then this is the appropriate after-tax opportunity cost to
investors in higher tax brackets Tci > In this case 8
(1 —t0)/(1
— andonly investors in higher than marginal capital gains
tax brackets can enjoy a surplus. Those with a lower capital gains tax rate
buy short term taxable (tax exempt) bondsiftci is less (greater) than t,.25
this number as an estimate of the standard deviation of returns on a consol,
then using (23) we can approximate s(0.O57)//.11 =.172.
Ibbotson and Sinquefield do not report the average change in the interest
rate so we somewhat arbitrarily examine the two cases a =0and a =
whichcorrespond to no expected change in the interest rate andin the consol
price, respectively. If we choose to interpret a as arisk premium measure,
then under the assumption of no drift in the interest rate, the expectedrate
of return on a consol is r(1 +ci).Ibbotson and Sinquefield estimate that
investors expected on average a premium of 131 basis points on twenty-year
bonds. This gives an estimate for a of 0.44 based on the averageinterest
rate.
Table 1 displays the value of the timing option as a percentageof price
for these parameter values (equations (29a, b)). It also presentsthe surplus
to non—marginal investors as a proportion of price. Thevalues presented are
for the marginal tax rates t .5and t= .25.
C
Forthe higher variance process the timing option contributes a signi-
ficant portion of the bond's value as measured against eitherbenchmark. For
the lower variance process the timing option remains important exceptin the
case when large capital losses are expected andthe continuous realization
18/—TheIbbotson and Sinquefield estimate based on a portfolio of long—
term bonds may be a downwardly biased estimate of thestandard deviation of a
consol's rate of return for two reasons:
(a) They considered a portfolio of bonds with an averagematurity of 20
years (not infinite).
(b) The variability of a portfolio of bonds generallyunderestimates the
return variability of each bond. For example, a shockin the economy which
raises the price of ten—year bonds and lowers the priceof thirty—year bonds
may leave the portfolio's price essentiallyunchanged and contribute little to
the variability of the portfolio's return. The same shock,however, may have
a significant impact on the consol's return.
Both of our estimates of s, particularly the first, mayalso be
negatively biased because the interest rate wassubstantially less than 11%
for most of this period.26
benchmarkis employed. We conclude that the potential effect of taxtrading
on bond prices cannot safely be ignored in practice.
Examination of the levels of investor surplus indicates that clienteles
can be either sharp or weak, depending on the parameter values of the
stochastic interest rate process. The first column illustrates a very precise
marginal clientele when large capital gains are expected and the two tax
effects are strongly enhancing. The final column shows a somewhat weaker
clientele structure with a reversed ordering when the two tax effects are
opposing. The impact of the ordinary tax is greater in this case because the
required coupon yield is over forty percent inexcessof the interest rate.
Theremaining columns are examples of broad marginal clienteles. Columns two
and five show the effect of differences in the capital gains tax rate alone.
5.(,tira1BondTrading--theGeneral Case
We examine a discrete-time version of the model outlined in Section 3,
focusingon the distinction betweenshort and long term gains and losses, the
effect of the amortization deduction and transactions costs. Since our
primary concern is on how optimal trading affects the bond prices, we confine
ourattention to the marginal bondholder.
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We assume that the trading interval is one year. If an asset is sold
one year after purchase, we assume that the holding period is short term or
long term at the investors discretion. Since the cutoff point is one year
after purchase, the investor can make the holding period long or short term,
19/
The choice of one year is primarily a matter of convenience,
coinciding with both the maximum holding period for short term losses and the
tax year.If the holding period were shorter, as it was until recently, and
the offset provision is assumed to be binding, then an additional complication
results. The value of short—term losses in the first part of the year cannot
be determineduntilit is knownifthere are later offsetting long term
capital gains. This problem affects only tax scenario II, below.27
by delaying or advancing the bond sale by only one day. By a simple dominance
argument, all capital gains are realized long term. Similarly whenever the
investor realizes a capital loss one year after purchasing the bond, he does
so short term.
We maintain our assumption that there are no forced realizations. On
each trading date the investor either holds his bond, deferring the
realization of a capital gain or loss, or sells his bond and immediately
repurchases it, thereby realizing a capital gain or loss and re-establishing a
short term status. The following set of factors determines whether the
investor holds his bond or executes a wash sale:
(a) If the bond price is below the basis, the investor would like to
sell the bond and receive the tax deduction immediately. The reason becomes
more compelling if the bond was purchased one year earlier, so that this is
the only chance to realize the capital loss short term.
(b) If the bond price is above the basis, the investor would like to
defer the realization of the capital gain and thereby defer the tax
liability. As stated previously, he never realizes a short term gain because
he can wait one more day. Nevertheless, he may wish to realize a long term
gain as explained in (c) and (d).
(c) A short term holding status is beneficial to the investor. This
status helps when he realizes a capital loss, because he realizes it short
term, and it never hurts, even when the investor realizes a capital gain,
because he can always wait one more day and convert to the long term status.
The short term status turns out to be a very important factor governing the
optimal liquidation policy. Under certain realistic conditions, an investor
may realize a capital gain solely to convert to thebeneficial short term
status.28
(d) The peculiar amortization rules on bonds introduce another twist to
this already complex problem. If the bond's basis is above par, this
difference is linearly amortized over its remaining term to maturity with the
"loss" applied against the investor's ordinary income. The present value of
this tax deduction is high for short maturity bonds, but decreases with longer
maturity, because of the linearity of the amortization rule. For short
maturity bonds the benefit in establishing a basis above par may be
sufficiently large to make it optimal to realize a capital gain.
We assume that the short term rate of interest, r, is the only state
variable and that it follows a driftless binomial random walk with two
reflecting barriers. We consider two specifications for the interest rate
process. In the low—variance process, the interest rate takes one of the
twenty—one values ,.04,.05,.06,...,• 24.If the interest rate equals any
of the interior values then at the next date it has the value r.01, each
with probability one half. If the interest rate is equal to one of the end-
point values .04 or .24 then at the next date it remains unchanged or takes on
the value .05 or .23, respectively with probability one half. The reader may
verify that the unconditional distribution of r is uniform over the twenty-
one points. The standard deviation of changes in the interest rate is
std(r(t +1)Ir(t))
=.01per year, independent of the state (except in
the end-point states).. In the high-variance process, the interest rate takes
one of the eleven values,.04,.06,...,. 24. The probabilities are as in the
low—variance process and the reflecting barriers are at the levels .04 and
.24. The standard deviation of the changes in the interest rate in the high—
variance process is a =.02per year. From the Ibbotson and Sinquefield
(1982) study, the annualized standard deviation of the short term rate is
.022. The low—variance process then underestimates the interest rate29
variability, while the high-variance process reflects the average variability
in the period 1926—1981.
As we shall see, the low—variance process implies, on average, that the
standard deviation of the annual rate of return of 20—year Treasury Bonds is
5.66%, if priced underthebuy—and-hold policy, and 5,82% if priced underthe
optimal policy with t =.25(scenario I). For the high—variance process,
the corresponding numbers are 9.47% and 8.73%, From the Ibbotson and
Sinquefield (1982) study this standard deviation is 5.7% for long term
Treasury bonds over the 1926-1981 period. Therefore the low—variance process
20/
ref lects the actual initial variability over that period. The high—
variance process maybemore representative of recent history.
In discrete time, the differential equation (9) becomes a difference
equation which we maysolvenumerically subject to the boundary conditions.
Equivalently and more directly we obtain the bond price and the value of a
bond to the marginal investor by dynastic prograxsm!ng, at dates
T, T —1,T —2,...,etc.
Equations (30) and (31) establish the bond price and value of a bond to
the investor at maturity, i.e., at t =T.At maturity the ex-coupon bond is
priced at par which we take to be unity.
P(r, T; c, T) =1. (30)
The value of the bond to an investor is the after—tax sale proceeds. By the
maturity date, the bond basis cannot exceed one, because the excess will have
20/—
See,however, the caveat in footnote (18). In addition, when the low—
variance process is used, the simulated volatility of a 20—year bond over its
life will be lower than the historic average because in the last part of its
life its price is more strongly affected by the short term rate so the
volatility is underestimated.30
been completely amortized by then. Thus only a gain can be realized at
maturity, and the appropriate capital gains tax rate is the long term rate.
Thus,
V(r, T; c, T; P, t) =1— + TLP• (31)
With the terminal values established, the bond's price and its value to a
given investor at points in time prior to maturity can now be obtained through
dynamic programming. We distinguish between the cases in which amortization
is and is not utilized.
The bond price is what a marginal investor is willing to pay for it. His
alternative is investing in the short term asset over the next year in which
case his investment increases at the prevailing after-tax interest rate. He
is indifferent to buying the bond, therefore, only if the after-tax coupon and
amortization benefit plus the expectation of the value function next period is
greater than the current bond price by exactly the after tax foregone interest.
If the bond is selling today for less than par, then its price is the appropriate
basis in the value function. If the bond is priced above par, then (P -1)/(T-
t)will be amortized in the next year, and the basis in the value function next
year is less than the prevailing price by this amount. Thus at time t
P (1 +(1—)r]{(1 —t)c+
E(V(r(t+1),t +1;c, T; P, t]}, if P 1 + (32a)
P =(1+(1—t )r]l{(1 —T)c+(p—l)r/(T—t)
E[V(r(t +1),t +1;c, TI P —(P—1)/(T—t),t]}, if P >1.(32b)31
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Thebond price, P, is the solution to (32a, b).
The value of a long position in the bond is the greater of the after-tax
proceeds from immediate sale and the discounted value of the benefits if the
bond is retained. The after—tax proceeds from immediate sale are








As in (32) the discounted benefits, if the bond is retained, are
[1 +(1—)r]C(1 —t)c+
(34a)
E[V(r(t +1),t +1;C,T;P, t)]}, if P( 1
and
[1 ÷ (1 -)r]l{(1 -T)c+(P-1)t/(T-t)+
(34b)
E[V(r(t +1),t +1;c, T; P —(P—1)/(T—t),t]},if >
In comparing equations (32) and (34) we note that P =V(r,t; c, T; P, t) so
the relation in (4a) is satisfied.
We illustrate the optimal trading policies for a bond with a 14 percent
stated coupon payable annually, in the four tax scenarios.
I. Treasury bond held by a high-tax—bracket individual, with =
= T:t=.25.
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The right-hand side of (32a) is positive at P =0since the first
term is, and the right—hand side of (32b) is less than P for large values
(since the maximum benefit of future tax losses is t(P—1)).These
expressions are continuous at P =1.Therefore a soution to (32a, b)
exists. For the dynamics assumed, the solution is also unique.32
Table 2 reports the bond prices and values, V, for the high variance
interest rate process, for a range of interest rates and bases, and for
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maturities 1, 5 and 20 years. Asterisks and daggers mark the states in
which a wash sale is optimal. Asterisks indicate the realization of acapital
gain establishing a new or higher amortizable basis. Daggers denote the
realization of a capital loss. If both the basis and the bond price are less
than one, the amortization feature is not in effect and the simple trading
rule is to realize a loss and defer a gain as indicated by daggers. If the
basis or the bond price exceeds one, the amortization feature becomes relevant
and complicates the rule.
For one—year bonds, if the bond sells at a premium, P >1,and the
basis is below the bond price, p < p, the investor realizes a capital gain
in order to establish a higher basis and benefit from the amortization of the
basis. For five—year bonds, the amortization benefit Is reduced and large
capital gains may be deferred. For example, if P =1.10and p =.8or
.9, the investor realizes a capital gain; but if P =.7the investor defers
the capital gain. The amortization benefit becomes negligible for twenty-year
bonds. For example, if P =1.25and p (1.2,the investor optimally
defers the realization of a capital gain and thereby foregoes the amortization
benefit of increasing the basis to 1.25. In fact, if P.88 and
p =1.1,1.2, or 1.3 the investor foregoes the amortization benefit and
realizes the capital loss.
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Someof the entries in this table as well as those in Table 3 give the
value fmction for states which could never arise along the optimal path. For
example, since losses are always realized when the basis is below par, the
basis can never be substantially in excess of the current price in this
situation. These entries, therefore, give the value of changing to the
optimal policy from a suboptimal position.33
II.Treasury bond held by a high-tax-bracket individual with 10=
.5,t= .5,t.= .25.
S L
Table 3 reports the bond price and values, V, for the high variance
interest rate process, for a range of interest rates and bases, and for
maturities 1, 5, and 20 years. Asterisks, daggers and double daggers mark the
states where the optimal policy is to perform a wash sale. Panel A reports
results when the bond has been held for longer than one year, t —t> 1,
while panel B reports results when the bond has been held for just one year,
t -t=1.Note that the value function in the two panels can differ only
when a wash sale is executed and a capital loss is realized. Whenagain is
realized,itis presumed to be long term so the taxes paid are the same. When
no wash sale occurs, the ensuing status must be long term regardless of the
current status.
These tables indicate that the investor performs a wash sale of long term
bonds practically every year in order to revert to the short term status.
This is emphasized by the double daggers which mark states in which a wash
sale is executed to this end alone. The desirability of the short term status
seems to dominate all other considerations.
III. Treasury bond held by a high-tax-bracket individual with 1 =
I == 0. s L
The optimal trading policy is quite simple and need not be illustrated in
a table. Whenever the bond price is above par and the basis, the investor
makes a wash sale to establish a higher basis and deduct from future ordinary
income the premium amortization. The investor has no tax incentives to
perform any other trades.34
IV.Treasury bond held by a bank or bond dealer with t= == .5.
c s L
Again the optimal policy can be described without a table. The Investor
optimally realizes all capital losses and defers the realization of capital
gains. He never realizes a capital gain in order to establish a higher basis
with the benefit of the amortization deduction. The tax rate on ordinary income
is the same as that on capital gains so amortization "losses" at best exactly
offset the capital gain and occur later. Neither does he defer the realization
of a capital loss in order to maintain the benefit of the amortization
deduction.
6. Bond Prices and the Tax Timing (tion
Table 4displays simulated Treasury bond prices that would be established
by the marginal investor, following the optimal trading policy under each of
the four tax scenarios. We assume that the current value of the short term
interest rate is 14%. For comparison, the 14% coupon bond would be priced just
above par if the marginal investor followed a buy-and-hold policy. The exact
buy—and—hold prices range from 1.002 to 1.071 for the high—variance process and
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from 1.001 to 1.030 for the low—variance process.
The prices which prevail under tax scenario II are uniformly higher than
those under scenario I since investors are not subject to the restrictive offset
provision of the tax code but can exploit in full their short term losses.
Furthermore, except for the bonds of five-year maturity, tax scenario II
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Buy-and—holdprices are computed with the formula (35) below.Even
though the interest rate is not expected to increase or decrease from 14%, the
yield curve is slightly downward sloping due to Jensen's inequality, and
prices are above par. For these and other premium bonds the buy—and—hold
policy assumes that the excess above par is amortized and deducted year by
year. Thus no capital losses (or gains) are earned on premium bonds under the
buy—and—hold policy. Therefore this benchmark price is the same for all
scenarios.35
typically results in the highest price. We would expect the second scenario to
yield high prices because shorttermlosses provide valuable rebates and a short
term holding period is relatively cheap to establish. This advantage is least
valuable for short maturity bondsbecausethey are the least volatile.
Consequentlyall of the five-year bonds anda few of the other short maturity
bonds arepriced highest under taxscenarioIII. There are two distinct
reasons.
First, for discount bonds the buy-and-hold price is highest under tax
scenario III since the guaranteed capitalgain escapes all taxation.Second,
withzero capital gainstax rate, it is costless to establish above—par
amortizablebasis. For sufficiently short maturities these twoeffects
dominate.
A comparison of the pricing under scenarios I, III, and IV is also of
interest.While their interpretation is radically different, they actually
differ in only one respect. The capital gain tax rates, both long and short
term, are .25, 0, and .5 respectively. All other taxes are the same. Scenario
III with the lowest taxratehas prices which are uniformly highest;
nevertheless, the high tax rate in scenario IV does not always induce the lowest
price. Again there is a tradeoff between the value of capital losses and the
cost of capital gains. The former is more important for the volatile longer
maturity bonds. The latter is more important for the shorter maturity bonds,
particularly those selling below par.
It is frequently asserted that discount bond prices are higher than what is
justified by the term structure of interest rates, reflecting the fact that a
portion of the return is realized as a lightly taxed capital gain. Our
discussion of Table 4 demonstrates that the above is just one of several tax
effectson bond prices. The direction andmagnitudeofthe tax effect depends36
critically on the tax scenario applicable to the marginal investor and on
whether the marginal investor follows a passive or optimal trading policy.
We now turn our attention to the tax timing option, defined asthe
difference between the bond prices under the optimal and buy-and-hold
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policies. Table 5 reports the value of the timing option as a percentage of
the bond price under the optimal policy. In each case the buy-and-hold price is
calculated using the corresponding long term capital gains tax rate (.25, .25,
0, .5). If this price is above par,. the amortization is deducted every year.
Thus no capital losses (or gains) are earned under the buy—and-hold policy for
premium bonds, and the benchmark price is the same for all scenarios. For
discount bonds the buy—and—hold prices vary across the scenarios and are
inversely related to the long term capital gains tax rate. The timing option
varies widely for different coupon rates, maturities, and tax scenarios, but in
most cases it represents a substantial fraction of the bond price just as the
example in section 4 illustrates.
The one exception is deep discount bonds.under tax scenario III. Here the
timing option is worth little since there is only a small probability of ever
amortizing a premium and no other tax trading benefit is possible. For bonds
selling near or above par, however, the timing option is more important under
tax scenario III than under scenarios I or IV. The binding deduction limit
under scenario III is a mixed blessing. On the one hand the individual may not
obtain tax rebates from the government by realizing capital losses. On the
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Analternative definition of the timing option is the difference
between the bond prices under the optimal and continuous realization
policies. The two definitions are compared in the example of Section 4.
Since the interest rate dynamics employed here are without drift, the results
are most similar to the case a =0in the continuous time model. The buy—
and—holdbenchmark resulted in smaller timingoptions in that case so our
choiceis conservative.37
other hand he can costlessly realize capital gains in order toraise the basis
and take advantage of the amortization deduction.
The reported values show that the tax timing option is typically increasing
in maturity. This is due to both the increased value of standard optionswhen
their maturities are lengthened and the greater volatility of the longer
maturity bonds underlying these options. This feature explains whythe 25- and
30—year 10% coupon bonds are mor.e expensive than thosewith 10— to 20—year
maturities even though the interest rate is above the coupon rateat 14% and the
yield curve is essentially flat.
Although longer maturity bonds generally have morevaluable timing options,
it does not follow that a larger tax subsidy flow is available on longbonds.
For example, holding two 15—year bonds in succession may provide greatertotal
tax benefit than a single 30—year bond provides. One way to comparethe
benefits of different maturity bonds is to express the timing option on an
annualized basis. The maturity of bonds with the largestannualized benefits
would then represent the natural "habitat" of investors particularlyconcerned
with tax benefits. The annualized tax subsidy on a T-yearbond is
approximately r(1 -t)/[1—exp(—r(1—t)T)]per dollar value of the tIming
option. Using this approximation we establish thatthe lowest annual subsidy is
on short maturity bonds. On bonds with ten or more yearsto maturity the
benefits are fairly constant, regardless of the tax scenario.
Annualizing the timing option also permits us to normalize thetax benefits
relative to the rate of return earned on the bond. For example,under the four
scenarios tax benefits provide on average 7, 32, 18 and 10 percent,
respectively, of the total return expected on the 25—year,14% coupon bond.
We have so far ignored transactions costs. A bid—ask spread orother costs
of trading will reduce the value of the timing option since the optimalpolicies38
involvesubstantially more trading than the buy-and-hold policy. Constantinides
has examined the optimal tax trading policy on stocks in the presence of
25/
proportional transactions costs. In a simple continuous—time lognormal model
he found that investors should not realize losses immediately, but should wait
until the price falls to a specific fraction of the basis. A similar rule
applies to ourmodelin section 4. Themodificationsto the optimal trading
policies of the models here are more complicated, but the basic idea remains the
game: Trades are deferred until capital gains and losses are larger than in the
absence of transactions costs.
Table 6 displays the value of the timing option when trading is costly.
The round—trip transaction cost is represented by a bid—ask spread of 0.2, 0.5
26/
or 1.0 percent of par. The timing option retains a large fraction of its
value even with sizeable transactions costs. Bonds of ten or more years to
maturity retain at least half of the original timing option even with one
percent transactions costs. The reduction maynotbe as large as we might have
expected because transactions costs are not entirely a dead weight loss. The
cost of purchase is added to the basis while the cost of sale is deducted from
the sales proceeds. Effectively, the taxing authority subsidizes the costs of
trading.
Transactions costsdecrease the value of the timing option on short
maturity bondsmore than they do on long maturity bonds. With one point bid-ask
spread, the five—year bond loses 71, 64, 46 or 75percent of its timing option
underthe four tax scenarioswhile bonds of at least fifteen years to maturity
25/—Inan earlier version of Constantinides (1 983).
26/—U.S.Treasury bonds are typically quoted with spreads of one-quarter
to one—half of a point in the Wall Street Journal. A few have spreads of one—
eighth of one point. Treasury note spreads are usually one—eighth to one—
quarter of a point.39
never give up more than 40 percent. At thirty-year maturities the examined
bonds always retain at least two-thirds of the value of their timing options.
7.The Tax—Adjusted Yield Curveand Implied Tax Bates
We demonstrated that bond prices set by the marginal investors following
the optimal trading policy are markedly different from those set under a buy—
and—hold or continuous—realization policy. In this section we explore the
inlications of these differences when interest rate and tax bracket estimates
are inferred from market prices.
Previous authors typically have assumed that a particular marginal investor
27/
holds the bond to maturity. Under this assumption the price of a bond with
maturity T, coupon rate c, and par value one is the solution to
T
P =(1—t )cZ 'r+(1—c÷ r p(ir , P< 1 (35a)
Ct LL T
T
P =[(1—T )c+r(P —1)/TIE i+ 11, P>1 (35b)
c c tT
where is the price at time zero of one dollar after tax at time t.
Given a set of bond prices, the resulting set of equations (35) can be
inverted to solve for the discount factors and the tax rates.
27/
See, for example, Caks (1977), McCulloch (1975), Robichek and Niebuhr
(1970), and Schaefer (1981). McCulloch explicitly and Caks implicitly use
equations identical to (35a). Robichek and Niebuhr impose the additional
assumption that all of the are related through a single interest rate.
Only McCulloch recognizes the premium amortization feature embodied in (35b).40
Robichekand Niebuhr(1970)do this by imposing the additional
assumptions = anda flat term structure, =(1+y)tThey
then solve for the remaining unknowns, 'rand y, using just two bonds.
Their estimates of the marginal tax bracket for the year 1968 range from 37.5%
to 50%, depending on the pair of bonds used (and disregarding the cheapest
flower bond).
McCulloch (1975) also assumes t= . r;however,he does not require L c
a flat term structure. Instead, he estimates the tax bracket and a cubic
splinefor the discount function to minimize a weighted sum of the squared
deviations between actual and modeled prices. Using data from 1963-1966 he
concludesthat "the effective tax rate that best explains the prices of U.S.
Treasury securities lies somewhere in the range .22 to .33." For new data
from 1973 the best estimate of the tax rate is only .19.
Pye (1969) estimates the tax bracket of the marginal bondholder using
various combinations of discount andpar, taxable and exempt bonds. The
analysis closest to ours compares par and moderately discounted taxable
bonds. Pyeconcludesthat the effective tax rate at the margin varies between
10% and 36% over the period 1967—1968.
Ouranalysisprovides a possible explanation of this finding. If bond
prices are set by investors who follow an optimal trading policy, estimates of
the yield curve and the marginaltax bracket obtained under the assumption of
a naive buy—and-hold policy maybebiased. To test for bias, we generate a
sanple of simulated bond prices under the assumptiOn of optimal trading
policies with known tax rates and yield curves. We then estimate the yield
curve and tax rate front thi.s sample by a procedurewhich i.s in thespiritof
themethodsdiscussed,41
Since our "data" is simulated and, therefore, not subject to measurement
error, there is no statistical advantage in using manyprices.Thus, like
Robichekand Niebuhr we use an exact "estimation" requiring only a few
bonds. We eliminatethe need of assuming a flat term structure, however, by
usingfour rather than two bonds. In fact with four bonds no smoothness
requirement for theyield curve even of the weak type assumed by McCulloch is
required.
For each estimation we use two different coupon bonds from each of two
adjacent maturities. Under an assumed buy—and—hold policy, the two longer
bonds with maturity T + 1are priced according to
T
P' =(1—t)cZit+ {i— r+ t P' + (1 —t)c}n , P< 1 (36a)




P' =[(1 —t)c+r (Pt —1)/T]E it+ [(1 —T)c + t (P' —1)/T+ 1]ir
c c =i
c c T+1
P' > 1 (36b)
while the shorter maturity bonds are priced by (35).
Substituting the four bond prices i.nto (35) and (36) gives four equations
in the five unknowns, E it,it ,it ,,andt.Ifwe assume
tTT+1 c L
TL =T/2f
the system of equations is now fully specified. We eliminate
T'T+1' and to obtain a quadratic equation i.nthe variable E
Solving for this unknown and then the others yields two solution sets. Only
one of these satisfies the constraints 0 it IT 1and t < 100%, and
T+1T C
28/
thisis the one chosen.
Tables7 and 8 report the errors in the estimated forward rates and the
estimated tax brackets on coupon income (correct tax bracket t =50%in
28/—Insome cases thisforcesnegative estimates for the tax rates.42
each case) for different maturities, tax scenarios, coupon rates and interest
29/
rate variances. The errors are usually opposite in signsincean increase
inthetax rate decreases the effective discount rate and errors of opposite
signshavepartially offsetting effects. In most cases the interest rate is
overestimated while the tax bracket is underestimated. In the extreme, the
tax rate is estimated to be negative.
The errors are usually smaller for the low—variance process, as wewould
expect, since the timing option then has less value and buy-and-hold prices
are more accurate. For the same reason, errors are smaller when the deep
discount bonds are used in the estimation.
The estimates are generally most accurate under tax scenario I. Again
this corresponds to the case when the timing option has the least value. Tax
scenario II yields very poor results as does scenario III when near par bonds
areused. Tax scenari.o IV i.s interesting because the Implied tax bracket Is
about the same for all maturities. It ranges between 20% to 30%, disturbingly
reminiscentof the tax rate estimated by NcCulloch. (By construction, the
actual tax rates in this case are all 50%.)
While the errors in the forward rates are often large, the computed
numbers are almost invariably within one standard deviation of both the
true forward rate and the single—period rate expected to prevail at the
forecast time. Consequently, verifying the induced tax trading bias i.n the
forward rates would require a large sample of data. Furthermore, even with
large amounts of data available, the errors probably could not be
distinguishedfrom liquidity or other term premia. Itisinteresting to note
29/
The error intheestimated forward rate is the deviation between the
estimate and the true forward rate calculated from the binomial model. The
trueforward rate is not equal to the future expected spot rate, 14% in thi.s
case, due to Jensen's inequality.43
thatthe positive errors are at least qualitatively consistent with the
usually claimed upward bias in the yield curve.
Wealso tried estimation under the buy—and-hold assumption with
t=0and T=T.Theserates are correct for tax scenarios III and IV
L L c
respectively, but the estimates are not noticeably improved, probably because
the buy-and—hold policy is "toofar"front optimal.
8.Municipal Bonds
Thetax treatment of municipal bonds differs from the tax treatment of
Treasuryand corporate bonds i.n two important respects. First, coupon income
on municipal bonds is exempt from Federal tax. Second, ifthepurchase price
in the secondary market is above par this excess must be amortized but the
amortized amount is not allowed as a deduction, even though the bond's tax
basi.s is correspondingly reduced. In effect the taxation of bond coupons and
of premium amortization are symmetric: for Treasury bonds, the coupons and
premium amortization are taxed at the individual's marginal tax rate on
ordinaryincome; for municipal bonds the coupons and premiumamortization
remain untaxed.
Coupon income on municipal bondsmay besubject to state tax, but inour
calculationswe ignore state taxes. We consider this a good first approxi-
mation for two reasons. Many states exempt from state tax the coupons on
bonds issued by municipalities within the state so the marginal holders of
such bonds may well be exempt front taxes. Also, while state tax rates vary
widely across states, they are generally very low relative to the Federal tax
30/
rates of investors who would consider holding municipal bonds.
30/—Asof 1980 seven states had no individual income tax on interest. More
thanhalf the states had maximum marginal tax rates at or below 7%. In only
three states was the maximumtaxrate above 11%.The highestrate was
Minnesota's16%.44
The main difference between the optimal trading policies for municipal
and taxable bonds is that no trades are ever made at a price above par since
there is no advantage in establishing an amortizeable basis. Since this is
the only trading advantage of taxable bonds under tax scenario III, the value
of the timing option on municipal bonds l.s zero i.n this scenario. At the
opposite extreme is tax scenario IV. In this case itisnever optimalto
establishan above par basis ona taxable bond, so the right to amortize such
a basis contributes nothing to the value of the timing option. Thus under
scenario IV, the value of the timing option on a municipal bond is equal to
that on a taxable bond with the same after—tax coupons (i.e., before-tax
coupons 1/(1 —r)times as large). Under tax scenarios I and II the timing
option on municipal bonds is less valuable than the option on coupon-
equivalent taxable bonds.
Table 9 presents the value of the timing option on municipal bonds. When
municipals are deep discount, the timingoption under scenariosI and II is
nearly as valuable as on coupon—equivalent taxable bonds. The same i.s true on
short maturity municipals even if the di scount is small. These, of course,
are the cases when the right to amortize the basis In the future has
negligible value. On premium municipal bonds the timing option is substan-
tially smaller than on coupon equivalent taxables, especially if the
comparison is made between short maturity bonds. For example, under tax
scenario II the timing option on short-maturity municipals is one—third as
large as the timing option on short—term taxables; the timing option on long-
term municipals is one—half as large as the timing option on long—term
taxab].es.45
9.concludingRemarks
This paper extended the work of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1981, 1983) on
valuing bondsandcombined it with the work of Constantinides (1982, 1983) and
Constantinides and Scholes (1980) on optimal trading policies. We determined
that of the tax timing option is an important fraction of the bond price.
We also discussed how the price distortion affects standard estimation
techniques for extracti.ng interest rates and marginal tax brackets from
observed bond prices. We found the implied errors to be substantial.
Although we focused on the value of the timingoptionto the marginal
bondholder, we didillustratein one case that the optimal trading policy
differs from the buy—and—hold or continuous realization policy for all taxed
investors. Thus, even if the marginal investor is tax exempt, the timing
option has positive value to other bondholders.
Our paper only examined the case when the tax bracket of the marginal
bondholder remains unchanged. That Is, investo may buy and sell the bond
in the course of the optimal trading policy, but the bond remains In the hands
of investors in the same tax bracket throughout its term to maturity. The
next step should be to recognize the existence of tax clienteles as in
Schaefer (1981); but unlike Schaefer, to explore the implications of the
bondholders' following optimal trading policies and of the bond being passed
from one tax bracket investor to another as its maturity shortens or as it
changes from a discount to a premium bond.46
TABLE1
The Value of the Timing Option and the Non—Marginal
Investor'sSurplus as a Percentage
of the Consol Pricea
s =0.604 s =0.172
a=0 a=52 a= .44 ct=0_____a—.44
Timingoption:
buyand hold
benchmark 7.7% 11.2 11.9 3.4 3.9 11.7
continuous real! zation
benchmark 44.9 11.2 9.0 4.9 3.9 0.5
Investor Surplus:
t t ci J.
0.5 0.5 11.2 20.3 22.7 3.9 4.7 22.1
0.6 0.25 277.1 0.0 —5.3 1.8 0.0 —16.8
0.4 0.2 —43.7 —4.1 —0.8 —1.9 —0.9 9.1
0.3 0.15 —62.7 —8.1 —2.6 —3.6 —1.9 15.7
0.0 0.0 —88.0—20.3 —11.1 —7.4 —4.7 26.3
aCouted for infinitely lived investors. Interest rate follows the
risk-adjusted stochastic process dr =ar2dt +sr312dw. Marginal bond-
holder's tax rates are =.5on coupon income and t= .25on all capital
gains. Non—marginal holders' tax rates are as given.47
TABLE 2
Treasury Bond Prices and Values of a Long Position Under Tax







.8 .9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3
Maturity =1year
0.06 1.0755 *0.98 *1.01 *1.03*1.06 1.09 1.14 1.18
0.10 1.0364 *0.95*0.98*1.00*1.03 1.07 1.11 1.16
0.14 1.0000 0.93 0.95 0.98*1.00 1.05 1.09 1.14
0.18 0.9762 0.91 0.94 0.96 P0.98 1.03 1.07 1.12
0.22 0.9535 0.90 0.92 0.94 tO.97 1.01 1.05 1.10
Maturity =5years
0.06 1.3363 *1.18 *1.20 *1.23 *1.25 *1.28 *1.30*1.33
0.10 1.771 *1.06*1.08*1.11 *1.13*1.16 1.18 1.22
0.14 1.0197 0.95 0.97 0.99 *1.01 1.05 1.08 1.12
0.18 0.9110 0.88 0.89 0.91 tO.93 0.96 1.00 1.04
0.22 0.8354 0.81 0.83 tO.85 tO.88 P0.90 0.93 0.97
Maturity =20years
0.06 1.7358 1.48*1.50*1.53*1.55 *1.58 *1.60*1.63
0.10 1.4187 1.26 1.27 1.29 1.31 1.34 1.36*j39
0.14 1.1044 1.03 1.04 1.06 1.08 1.10 tl.13tl.15
0.18 0.8793 0.85 0.86 tO.88 tO.91 tO.93 tO.96tO.98
0.22 0.7429 0.74P0.76 tO.78 P0.81 tO.83 tO.86tO.88
rate on bond is0.14paid annually. Interest rate follows high—
variance process with standard deviation of .02 per year. Asterisks and dag-
gers mark the states in which the optimal policy is to perform awash sale.
Asterisks indicate the realization of a long term capital gain establishing a
new or higher amortizable basis. Daggers denote the realization of a long
term capital loss.48
TABLE 3
Treasury Bond Prices and Values of a Long Position Under Tax







.8 .9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3
Panel A: Long Terni Status
Maturity =1year
0.06 1.0755 *0.98 *1.01 *1.03*1.06 1.09 1.14 1.18
0.10 1.0364 *0.95 *0.98 *1.00 *1.03 '1.07 1.11 1.16
0.14 1.0000 0.93 0.95 0.98*1.00 1.05 1.09 1.14
0.18 0.9762 0.91 0.94 0.96 'P0.98 1.03 1.07 1.12
0.22 0.9535 0.90 0.92 0.94tO.97 1.01 1.05 1.10
Maturity =5years
0.06 1.3476*119 *1.21*1.24*1.26*1.29*1.31*1.34
0.10 1.1919 *1.07*1.09*1.12*1.14*1.17 'P1.19 1.22
0.14 1.0368 0.95 *098 *100 *103 'P1.05 1.08 1.12
0.18 0.9177 0.88 0.89 *0.91 'P0.98 'P1.00 1.04 1.04
0.22 0.8357 0.81 0.83 'P0.85 tO.88 tO.90 0.93 0.97
Maturity =20years
0.06 1.9200 *1.62*1.64*1.67*1.69*1.72 *1.74*1.77
0.10 1.6138*139 *141 *144 *1.46*1.49 *1.51 *1.54
0.14 1.2672 *113*1.15 *118 *1.20*123 *1.25 'P1.28
0.18 0.9791 *0.91*0.93tO.96 'P0.98 'P1.01 'P1.03 P1.06
0.22 0.7856*0.76P0.79'P0.81'P0.84'P0.86'P0.89tO.91
Panel B: iort Term Status
Maturity=1year
0.06 1.0755*098 *101*103*1.06 'P1.09 'P1.14 'P1.19
0.10 1.0364*0.95*0.98*1.00 *103tl.07tl.12'P1.17
0.14 1.0000 0.93 0.95 0.98*1.00 'P1.05 'P1.10 'P1.15
0.18 0.9762 0.91 0.94 0.96 'P0.99 'P1.04 'P1.09 'P1.14
0.22 0.9535 0.90 0.92 0.94 P0.98 tl.03 'P1.08 P1.13
Maturity =5years
0.06 1.3476*119 *121 *124 *126 *129 *1.31*134
0.10 1.1919*1.07*1.09*1.12*1.14 *117P1.20'P1.25






0.14 1.2672 *1.13*115 *118 *1.20*1.23*1.23'P1.28
0.18 0.9791*0.91*0.93*0.96tO.99'P1.04'P1.09'P1.14
0.22 0.7856*0.76'P0.79'P0.84'P0.89tO.941'0.99P1.04
aCouponrate on bond is c =0.14,paid annually. Interest rate follows
the high—variance process with standard deviation of 0.02 per year. Asterisks,
daggers, and double daggers mark the states in which the optimal policy is to
perform a wash sale. In each case, one of the benefits is reestablishing a
shortterm holding status.Asterisks and doubledaggersindicate the realization
of.a long term capital gain. The former also denote the establishing of a new or
higher amortizable basis. Daggers Indicate the realization of a long or short
term capital loss in panels A and B respectively.49
TABLE4
Treasury Bond Prices Established by Optimal Trading
Policies Under Each Tax Scenarioa
Maturity
High-variance Process a =.02per year
Low—variance Process
=.01per year r
scenario:bIII III Iv I II III Iv
acomputed at the rnJdpoint of the interest rate range, r =.14.
axscenarios are described by their capital gains tax rates. If the
investor is an individual, these depend on whether the short—term loss/long—term
gain offset rule and the $3,000 deduction limit are binding. For banks and
dealers these rules are not applicable. In each case the ordinary tax rate is
= .5.
Scenario I: Offset rule binding, deduction limit not binding, T5 =tL =.25
Neitherrule binding, r =t
=.25
Deduction limit binding, offset rule irrelevant == 0






10 0.6900.7080.7280.642 0.6810.6830.721 0.628










15 0.8410.9230.8740.833 0.812 0.842 0.8310.800
20 0.8320.9470.8650.836 0.7960.8460.8120.792


























Value of the Timing Option on Treasury Bonds
as Reflected by the Percentage Difference







Tax scenario:b I II III IV I IIIII IV
Maturity
Coupon rate c =.06










0,0 0.1 0.0 0.1
10 1.5 6.12.52.2 0.3 1.60.20.9
15 2.6 11.24.3 4.2 0.84.40.92.0
20 3.4 15.15.55.8 1.47.41.63.1
25 3.917.96.9 6.1 2.010.02.44.0






10 3.9 9.4 8.12.8 1.94.84.21.5
15 5.014.2 10.84.7 2.68.0 6.1 2.7
20
• 5.417.6 12.0 6.1 3.010.77.43.7
25 5.519.8 12.47.0 3.312.78.24.5
30 5.421.2 12.27.6 3.414.38.65.0
5 1.7




10 3.5 8.48.32.0 1.94.34.80.8
15 4.212.8 11.03.4 2.3 7.0 6.9 1.6
20 4.415.9 12.34.5 2.39.38.22.3
25 4.417.6 12.75.3 2.411.18.92.9
30 4.318.2 12.45.9 2.512.29.23.4
aCouted at the midpoint of the interest rate range, r =.14.
scenariosare described bytheir capital gainstax rates. If the
investor is an individual, these depend on whether the short—term loss/long-term
gain offset rule and the $3000 deduction limit are binding. For banks and
dealers these rules are not applicable. In each case the ordinary tax rate i.s
=.5.
Scenario I: Offset rule binding, deduction limitnot binding,r5 =
= .25
II:Neither rulebinding, T5'tL=.25
III:Deduction limitbinding,offset rule irrelevant, t5 = 0
IV: Bank or dealer at margin, 5 =tL=51
TABLE 6
Effects of Transactions Costs on the Timing ot0a
TaxScenarioI: t== TaxScenarioII:t=.5, =
aL S L
Maturity Value of Timing Option Value of Timing Option
k =0.0 0.2 0.5 1.0 k =0.0 0.2 0.5 1.0
5 1.7%1.4 1.0 0.5 3.3%2.8 2.0 1.2
10 3.9 3.3 2.7 2.0 9.4 8.4 7.0 5.0
15 5.0 4.4 3.8 3.0 14.2 13.1 11.4 8.7
20 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.5 17.616.314.411.4
25 5.5 4.9 4.3 3.7 19.818.416.513.2
30 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.6 21.1 19.917.8 14.4
b . b
TaxScenario III:t == 0 Tax Scenario IV: t == .5
aL aL
Maturiy Value of Timing Option Value of Timing Option
k =0.0 0.2 0.5 1.0 k =0.0 0.2 0.5 1.0
5 3.5%3.2 2.7 1.9 0.8%0.6 0.4 0.2
10 8.1 7.6 6.9 5.9 2.8 2.6 2.3 1.9
15 10.8 10.1 9.3 8.2 4.7 4.5 4.2 3.7
20 12.011.310.4 9.2 6.1 5.8 5.5 5.0
25 12.411.610.7 9.4 7.0 6.7 6.4 5.9
30 12.211.410.5 9.2 7.6 7.4 7.0 6.6
acomputed atmidpoint of interest rate range, r.14. Interest rate follows
high—varianceprocess with standard deviation of.02 per year. Coupon rate on bond
c=.14.k measures the transactions costs (bid—ask spread) as a percentof par.
Tax scenarios are as outlined inTable4.
scenarios are described by their capital gains tax rates.If the investor
is an Individual, these depend on whether the short-termloss/long term gain offset
rule and the $3,000 deduction limit are binding. Forbanks and dealers these rules
are not applicable. In each case the ordinary taxrate i.sT =.5.
Scenario I: Offset rule binding, t == .25 C
II: Neither rule binding, =,= .25
III: Deduction limit binding, offset rule irrelevantt =tL
=0
IV: Bank or dealer at margin, T =tL
=.552
TABLE 7
Errors (Basis Points) l.n Estimated Forward Rates under the
Buy—and—Hold Assumption with TL =•
a
Forecast High—variance Process Low—variance Process
Period =.02per year =.01per year r r
Std. Tax ScenarioC std. Tax ScenarioC
Dev.b I IIIII IV Dev.biiiiiiiv
(Coupon rates on bonds used for estimation .08, .10)
5 400 39203—136 466 200 527—201470
10 54985266 22357 30017 201—134350
15 59598255 126287 40333 243—64 284
20 620105283243238 42642 271 10246
25 62598296 391198 46850 292 87212
30 63182338657179 49757 318 175192
(Couponratesonbondsused forestimation.04,.06)
5 400 5 30—200467 200 0 0—201420
10 549 7129—146328 300 1345—167338
15 595 6 112—125260 403 665—138262
20 620 4 97—105211 426 7141—114222
25 625 0 67. —97 151 468 7149 —94188
30 631 —23 47 —83 94 497 0127 —79138
aCO,uted at midpoint of interest rate range r =.14.Errors reported
i.nbasis points.
bStandarddeviation of single period interest rate being forecasted.
CT scenarios aredescribed by their capital gains taxrates.If the
investor is an individual, these depend on whether the short-term loss/long-
term gain offset rule and the $3,000 deduction limit are binding. For banks
and dealers these rules are not applicable. In each case the ordinary tax
rate is tc =
ScenarioI: Offset rule binding, deduction limit not binding,
•ts
== .25
II: Neither rule binding, 5= ' = .25
III: Deduction limit binding, offset rule irrelevant, r =TL=0
IV: Bank or dealer at margin, 5 =TL•53
TABLE 8
Estimated Tax Brackets under the Bu-and-Ho1d
Assumption with TL =
High—varianceProcess Low—variance Process
Maturity a =.02per year a =.01per year
r r
Tax scenariob
I II III IV I II III IV
(Coupon rates on bonds used in estimation .08, .10)
5 44% 17 52 20
10 36 17 28 23
15 35 0 14 25
20 35 —17 —6 26
25 38 —26 —36 29
30 44 —48—108 27
(Coupon rates on bonds used in estimation .04, .06)
5 49 44 63 18
10 48 20 55 27
15 47 20 56 29
20 47 18 54 30
25 48 24 56 39
30 55 27 55 50
aComputed at the midpoint of interest rate range, r =.14.True tax
bracket in each case is t=50%.
bTax scenarios are described by their capital gains tax rates. If the
investor is an individual, these depend on whether the short-term loss/long-
term gain offset rule and the $3,000 deduction limit are binding. Forbanks
and dealers these rules are not applicable. In each case the ordinary tax
rate is T=.5.
C
ScenarioI: Offset rule binding, deduction limit not binding,
t=t=.25
s L
II: Neither rule binding, = t:t =.25
III: Deduction limit binding, offset rule irrelevant,
TT =0
s L
IV: Bank or dealer at margin, t = =
4945 63 18
47 11 53 27
44 7 42 31
42 —2 30 31
40—15 16 31
38—33 —4 30
50 50 63 26
47 39 59 28
48 30 56 32
47 8 54 32
47 5 52 33
49 11 51 435.4.
TABLE 9
Valueof the Timing Option on Municipal BondsasReflected
bythePercentageDifference between the Prices
under the Optimal and Buy-and-Hold Policiesa
High-variance Process Low—variance Process
Maturity .02 per year =.01per year
Tax scenariob
I II IV I II IV
Couponratec =.03
5 0.0% 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
10 0.5 2.6 1.6 0.1 0.3 0.4
15 1.2 6.6 3.4 0.4 1.0 1.3
20 1.9 10.5 5.1 0.7 1.9 2.4
25 2.5 13.6 6.3 1.0 3.0 3.4
30 3.0 15.9 7.1 1.2 4.1 4.2
Couponratec =.05
5 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1
10 0.7 3.8 2.2 0.2 1.2 0.9
15 1.5 7.2 4.2 0.6 2.9 2.0
20 2.2 10.0 5.8 1.0 4.5 3.1
25 2.8 12.2 6.1 1.3 5.8 4.0
30 3.2 13.8 7.7 1.5 6.8 4.7
Couponrate c =.07
5 0.2 1.0 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.4
10 0.9 3.3 2.8 0.5 1.7 1.5
15 1.8 5.7 4.7 0.9 2.9 2.7
20 2.4 7.9 6.1 •1.2 3.9 3.7
25 3.0 9.6 7.0 1.5 4.8 4.5
30 3.4 11.1 7.6 1.7 5.4 5.0
CouponRate c =.09
5 0.6 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.2
10 1.4 3.1 2.0 0.7 1.5 0.8
15 2.1 4.9 3.4 1.0 2.2 1.6
20 2.6 6.6 4.5 1.3 2.7 2.3
25 2.9 8.1 5.3 1.4 3.2 2.9
30 3.2 9.4 5.9 1.5 3.7 3.4
aCOUSdat the midpotrit of the interest rate range r =.14.bTax
scenarios are described by thel.r capital gains tax rates. If the investor is
an individual, these depend on whether the short—term loss/long-term gain
offset rule and the $3,000 deduction limit are binding. For banks and dealers
these rules are not applicable. In each case the ordinary tax rate i.s
=.05.
Scenario I: Offsetrulebinding, deduction limit not binding, t= t = .25
II: Neither rule bJ.nding, t= .5, .25
III: Deduction limi.t binding, offset rule irrelevant, t=t=0
SL
IV:Bankordealer at margin, t=t=.5
S L
Timingoption i.s always zero under tax scenario III.5
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